Gerald L. Atkinson
Copyright 15 June 2004
This essay is a continuation of the subject of the invasion and occupation of Iraq in the war against Jihadistan -- our 'stateless' yet real enemy who attacked America on 11 September 2001, the first such external attack on our homeland since the War of 1812. The first essay which addressed this subject, 'The Occupation of Iraq,' pointed out the dangers -- since realized -- of a long-lasting occupation of that state. This essay comes to grips with the reality that a strong American response to state-sponsored terrorism of global reach was necessary to the survival of American civilization. Regime change in Iraq was mandatory. Fortress America with both control of the seas and a dominant 'forward presence,' supporting a preemptive war against Islamic terrorism are paramount in the defense of America. The spread of 'democracy' by force of arms in the Middle East is not. This essay supports that point of view.
I am and have been one who appreciates and measures the contribution by American Jewry -- thus far -- as an overall positive factor in American history. This stems primarily from the realization that had Einstein, Oppenheimer, and others not chosen freedom over Nazi oppression, Hitler -- not the U.S. -- would have had the first atomic weapon. This would have been a catastrophe for the world.
While Jews had almost no influence or part in the settlement and formation of the United States of America, their influence and power since has evolved from their taking advantage of the opportunities offered by our meritocracy based on freedom. In the words of the authors of 'Why the Jews: The Reason for Anti-Semitism,' Jews "have led higher quality lives than their non-Jewish neighbors in almost every society in which they have lived." In this same sense, the author of 'The Holocaust Industry,' asserts that "What an American Jewish child inherits... is 'no body of law, no body of learning and no language, and finally, no Lord [can explain this] … but a kind of psychology: and the psychology can be translated in three words: 'Jews are better.'"
The same author informs us that after WWII, "per capita Jewish income is almost double that of non-Jews, sixteen of the forty wealthiest Americans are Jews; 40 percent of American Nobel Prize winners in science and economics are Jewish, as are 20 percent of professors at major universities; and 40 percent of partners in the leading law firms in New York and Washington. The list goes on. Far from constituting an obstacle, Jewish identity has become the crown of that success."
The other side of the coin of the benefit of American Jewry is the universally held view of historians, expressed by Paul Johnson in his 'A History of the Jews,' that from the age of Moses onward, Jews "...were strengthening and confirming a tendency...to be subversive of the existing order. They [became] a revolutionary people who did not recognize the cities, power and wealth of the day, and who were able to perceive that there is a moral order superior to the order of the world...There are times when the[ir] Bible seems to suggest that the whole aim of righteousness is to overturn existing, man-made order."
The Jewish authors of 'Why the Jews' reinforce this view. "The Jews entered history - and have often been since - at war with other people's most cherished values...From its earliest days the raison d'être of Judaism has been to change the world for the better... This attempt to change the world, to challenge the gods, religious or secular, of the societies around them, and to make moral demands upon others...has constantly been a source of tension between Jews and non-Jews." This, of course, is evidenced every day in America as the ADL, ACLU, and other American elite-Jewish organizations act across the entire spectrum of American civil affairs.
And elitist American Jewry carries out these attacks on American tradition on a broad front of civil issues while at the same time appropriating to themselves the right to exclusion from the same strictures. For example, we are not to have even a non-denominational prayer before meals at public institutions (e.g. the U.S. Naval Academy, VMI, etc.) while at the same time Jews raise funds for and construct a Jewish chapel, capable of serving 400 people at the Naval Academy, located adjacent to Bancroft Hall, the school's dormitory.
Kevin MacDonald, in his three-volume study of Jews and their role in history, advances a carefully researched but extremely controversial thesis: that [according to a reviewer] certain 20th century intellectual movements -- largely established and led by Jews -- have changed European societies in fundamental ways and destroyed the confidence of Western man. He claims that these movements were designed, consciously or unconsciously, to advance Jewish interests even though they were presented to non-Jews as universalistic and even utopian.
Another reviewer (on Amazon.com) of MacDonald's book intones "[it] provides a unique, well-documented explanation for nearly all the plagues which have afflicted us in the past century - Marxism, psychoanalysis, massive third world immigration, egalitarianism, promotion of homosexuality...and the profound corruption of the social sciences. These are not independent, unrelated catastrophes which simply descended upon us from nowhere, they are all part of one massive campaign. According to MacDonald, the current Zeitgeist in its various manifestations is the product of Jews and Jewish organizations working for many decades to re-create the social and political world of the West, but by bit, into one which is maximally favorable to their own ethnic interests."
Another Amazon.com reviewer of the book claims that "For those who would dismiss MacDonald's thesis, consider the current ethnic makeup of the neo-conservatives surrounding Bush and who run influential opinion journals. In launching the recent war...against Iraq, the Bush administration and its coterie of (heavily Jewish) scribblers at National Review, The New Republic and The Weekly Standard defended the indefensible by couching their reasons in universalistic moralisms. Consistent with the pattern of Jewish behavior described by MacDonald, they keep close ties to their own kind, contributing to the political doctrines of extreme right-wing Likudniks back in Israel (think of Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, et. al.). Likewise, they've systematically redefined America and her relationship to the world...in order to present our republic as an international one-gun defender of democracy. This anti-historical interpretation conveniently serves the interests of Israel while leaving Americans to shoulder the long term and short term consequences. They're forever citing one another's works and publicly bolstering one another's viewpoints in an effort to present a front of reasonable minds rather than a mob of rabid ethnic hacks. In the vein of David Frum and Johah Goldberg, they've denounced critics of neo-conservative policy as anti-Semites regardless of whether warranted or not. From the far left to the far right, everyone who has questioned the motives of the recent war has been tried, condemned and sentenced to the loony fringe. Likewise, they have adopted white boys like Wm. Bennett and Fred Barnes to serve as shabbas goyim front men in their campaign to turn America into the military arm of Zionism. These behavior patterns are entirely consistent with those covered by MacDonald in [his book, The Culture of Critique]."
While this view has gained some standing among Americans who gravitate to 'conspiratorial' explanations, it disregards the fact that American Jewry is as disparate and contradictory in its views of the world as was the Sanhedrin in the time of Christ. American Jews are at the helm of every issue (pro and con) that is contested in public and private discourse in America. For every Jewish 'believer' in the so-called neoconservative agenda, there is one who opposes it. For example, Noam Chomsky is as adamantly opposed to the state of Israel as he is to American nationalism. His center of influence is in the American academic world, whereas the neoncons mentioned above are in the media and government world. This is as prominent in America today as it has been for the Jews wherever they may have resided.
Paul Gottfried, an American Jew, has a broader critique of MacDonald's books. He observes that "MacDonald's argument is based on two presuppositions. One, [he] regards the Jews not as a succession of self-identified peoples revealing genetic and cultural overlap, but as a single nation existing from antiquity to the present. Since Jews view themselves in this fashion and because they have been at pains, until recently, to refrain from intermarriage, his assumption may be defensible. Two, MacDonald maintains that contemporary Jews, particularly in the United States, oppose and protest even the remnants of the Christian host culture not because of any threat they face but simply in order to displace what they view as alien. Their distinctive culture, group dynamics, and jealously guarded genetic inheritance explain why organized Jewry resists any public manifestation of a non-Jewish American identity. Related to this stance of relentless opposition, which finds academic expression in the 'culture of critique,' is a Jewish characteristic that MacDonald views as invariably present: a drive to compete for social and material resources with those perceived as outsiders."
Gottfried continues, "MacDonald infers too much from current Jewish social behavior. Granting that present-day Jews and Jewish organizations deny to host nations the ethnic solidarity they claim for themselves, what historical generalizations can be drawn from this fact? MacDonald leaves the impression that Jews in exile have always operated in this fashion, but the gaps in historical evidence are too large to justify the inference. As he himself acknowledges, Jews a thousand years ago viewed life among gentiles as a penalty for their sins, a penalty which they would continue to suffer until a national savior returned them to their ancestral land. Before the last two centuries, Jews were in no position to dispossess gentiles, but co-existed with them in a situation of disparity. Even had they wanted to take over a Christian society, such a goal would have seemed beyond reach. And given their exclusion from professional and many commercial activities, pre-modern Jews could not successfully compete for resources. But is the Jews' present attempt at reconstructing gentile societies a recurrent aspect of Jewish-gentile relations? Or is MacDonald dealing with a unique cultural context, in which Jews and gentiles play historically conditioned roles?"
"Over the last hundred years or so, Jews have moved out of a traditional Talmudic society to assume commanding positions in an increasingly secularized and morally confused Christian world; they have done so most dramatically in Anglo-phone societies, whose Protestantism represents Christianity in its least anti-Semitic form and whose prevalent political traditions are the most individualistic. From these favorable circumstances, according to MacDonald, two developments have emerged: Jews have made disproportionate contributions to science, the professions, and commerce; they have also contributed to the breakdown of traditional gentile culture."
"MacDonald has devoted an entire volume to the latter activity, treating it as illustrating a Jewish double standard. While celebrating internationalism, socially critical individualism, and antiseptically secular public squares, Jews are forever making exceptions for themselves. Those who fail to recognize and exalt this exception earn the censure of Jewish spokesmen, who condemn them either as anti-Semites or as Jewish self-haters. MacDonald offers so many instances of this double standard that he belabors the obvious as he reaches back to the late 19th century for examples of Jewish civic leaders taking stands simultaneously on behalf of a supposed Jewish right to ethnic cohesion and a heterogeneous American nation."
Gottfried concludes his critique. "For me, the most engrossing part of MacDonald's trilogy is a long, learned section in the third volume entitled, 'The Frankfurt School and Pathologization.' The Authoritarian Personality, published in 1950 by the American Jewish Committee, bore the marks of the Frankfurt School. Its editors and contributors, particularly Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, were the fathers of the school's Critical Theory, and it is hard to study that turgid exploration of 'fascist' and 'pseudo-democratic' personality-types without noticing its social point of reference. Adorno, Horkeimer, Ilse Frenkel, and Paul Lazarsfeld were all Frankfurt groupies before they contributed to this collective enterprise. So were Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse who wrote supporting puff pieces. The pivotal themes in The Authoritarian Personality, as emphasized by MacDonald, were nothing new to those who assisted in the project: Rather, they represented the same complaints directed against Western - not only German - society by the youthful radicals grouped around Adorno at the University of Frankfurt in the early 1930s. From Frankfurt, these 'anti-Nazis' emigrated to the United States; later, they re-established their ideas in postwar Germany in the context of Allied de-nazification. Little attention was paid to the fact that the proposed antidotes for Nazism were not exactly disease-specific: 'They targeted anything that gave cohesion to middle-class families and societies.'"
"MacDonald argues that the 'pathologization' of normal gentile society in The Authoritarian Personality foreshadows today's coerced political correctness. The social criticism of the Frankfurt School implies the need for a powerful regime of socialist administrators to level inequalities and re-socialize reactionary personalities. MacDonald links this call for massive social engineering to characteristically Jewish concerns and anxieties shared by its overwhelmingly Jewish formulators: The gentile Other would remain - or so it was assumed - a prowling presence absent reconstruction of the surrounding society. The plea for re-socialization in 1950 continued to resonate among Jewish 'social scientists' who shared Adorno's fears; both it and the rhetoric in which it was couched live on in the efforts of Jewish organizations to identify traditional Christian values with incipient 'fascism.'"
Given this brief summary of the variegated Jewish influence on American culture and its foreign policy, one might ask 'Just who are the Neoconservatives?' And what might their interests be, if any -- aside from pure and direct American interests? And what might their interests be in our current war with and occupation of Iraq?
I will preface the answers to these questions by an account of personal experience. I am intimately familiar with the destructive power of nuclear weaponry. While serving aboard the USS Randolph, flying the single-seat A4D Skyhawk during the late 1950s, I planned and would have carried out a nuclear weapon attack on Soviet or Eastern European targets. We stood Q-duty while in port, during which we committed to memory the low level routes to targets on the list [years before ICBMs and SLBMs launchable from submarines]. We [in addition to Air Force B-47s] were the nuclear deterrent. In addition, each of us had a 'personal target' which we also committed to memory. One of mine was Leningrad (if we were called to launch from the North Sea). Another was the capitol of Bulgaria (reachable from the Mediterranean Sea). In retaliation, I would have done everything in my power to reach the target and kill from one to three million people -- in spite of the fact that it would have been a 'suicide' mission. We had insufficient fuel to fly back to the ship. Bailout over the barren mountains of Turkey was the only hope of survival. Our enemy is as determined.
Upon retirement from the Navy I directed part of an effort in the 1980s to understand how potential enemies could acquire nuclear weapons, starting from scratch. The fact that Third World states, rogue states, terrorist organizations, and even drug cartels had the economic and geographic wherewithal to acquire such weapons for a meager $135M and a stable of only 13 or so scientists -- if they had access to potential weapons grade nuclear materials. These findings were supported by scientists from our national laboratories.
I also directed and wrote a 1980 report on 'The State of the Art on Vulnerability to Terrorism of U.S. Resource Systems.' We found that over eight major American 'systems' were not only vulnerable to terrorist attack, but that they were defenseless to even the most primitive attacks.
The most important experience I gained, however, was while serving as the Principal Advisor to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Delegate to the SALT II talks with the Soviets (1974-1976). During our private and in-depth discussions with Soviet counterparts, I had an opportunity to assess the 'enemy's attitude' toward the strategic arms limitation endeavor. While it became transparently obvious that we Americans did more negotiating among ourselves (and it was difficult to keep the other U.S. agencies from 'giving away the store') than with the Soviets, there was a prevailing attitude on the Soviet side of limitations being a 'practical' matter (but they would, nevertheless, pocket any gratuitous concessions on our part). I recall one conversation with a Soviet general officer who, in a moment of grave contemplation, told me that he and his comrades remembered with horror the devastation that befell the defense of Stalingrad. He 'did not ever want to see such destruction again on his homeland.'
This reinforced the fact that the Soviets, our powerful and resourceful enemy in the Cold War, were at heart -- practical rationalists. It is clear that the current threat to America's survival -- Islamic terrorists of global reach -- are not rational. Had they had even a single nuclear weapon on 9/11 and even the crudest means to deliver it, they would have used it on us. Untold thousands would have died.
Consequently, the invasion of Iraq and regime change there was a necessity. Why? Aside from the other 'rationales' for the war with Iraq, it was necessary to demonstrate to other hostile states -- especially irrational Arab states -- that we would not tolerate even their most minimal attempt to either acquire nuclear weapons or support other hostile entities which might seek to acquire them. The message was clear to the ruling elites of those states: such activities, even if unfulfilled, would lead to swift armed intervention and 'regime change.'
Conventional terrorist activities (if there is such a thing) would be countered in direct and specific targeting of individuals and their leaders in America's war on terrorism, but the act of acquiring nuclear capabilities of any sort would be met with 'regime change.' It was important to America's survival to send that message. Regardless of how or when we extract ourselves from the occupation of Iraq, that message had to be sent -- as it was. And that message has absolutely nothing to do with the state of Israel or our Neocons. It would have had to have been sent even if neither existed.
The answer to questions of Neocon motives are important to understand. We will find the answer to them as the nature of America's occupation of Iraq becomes more clear.
So, just who are the Neoconservatives who are at the fore in counseling certain aims and actions with regard to Iraq? The New York Times ('How a Marxist Hotbed Eased Right,' 01/03/97) reveals that Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Bell -- all neoconservatives -- were radical Marxists in the late 1930s at City College of New York. In that intellectual milieu, "Karl Marx would have gotten more votes than [the Republican or Democrat candidates for president]."
In a 'follow-on' article (NYT, 'When Left Turns Right, It Leaves The Middle Muddled,' 09/16/00), Irving Kristol, the so-called 'Godfather' of the Neoconservative Movement, is described as a "Trotskyite in his teens" and Norman Podhoretz, former editor of 'Commentary,' a "disciple of Lionel Trilling (the forebear) who "identified himself as a liberal."
None of this liberal-Left beginning seems to phase these neoconservative stalwarts. Kristol is quoted "I became a radical because I thought I had good reason to become radical. I became liberal because I thought I had good reason to become liberal. And then I became conservative because I thought I had good reason to be a conservative. It seems to me perfectly natural." Of course!
The Jewish authors of 'The Holocaust Industry' are not so blasé about the motives of the elites of American Jewry. "Until fairly recently...the Nazi holocaust barely figured in American life. Between the end of WWII and the late 1960s, only a handful of books and films touched on the subject...Not only Americans in general but also American Jews, including Jewish intellectuals, paid the Nazi holocaust little heed...The reason for public silence on the Nazi extermination was the conformist policies of the American Jewish leadership and the political climate of postwar America. In both domestic and international affairs American Jewish elites hewed closely to official U.S. policy Doing so in effect facilitated the traditional goals of assimilation and access to power. With the inception of the Cold War, mainstream Jewish organizations jumped into the fray. American Jewish elites 'forgot' the Nazi holocaust because Germany -- West Germany by 1949 -- became a crucial postwar American ally in the…confrontation with the Soviet Union."
"Everything changed with the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. By virtually all accounts, it was only after this conflict that The Holocaust became a fixture in American Jewish Life...From early on, American Jewish elites harbored profound misgivings about a Jewish state. Uppermost was their fear that it would lend credence to the 'dual loyalty' charge...Although Israel aligned with the West soon after the state was formed, many Israelis in and out of government retained strong affection for the Soviet Union; predictably, American Jewish leaders kept Israel at arm's length...From its founding in 1948 through the June 1967 war, Israel did not figure centrally in American strategic planning. As the Palestinian Jewish leadership prepared to declare statehood, President Truman waffled, weighing domestic considerations (the Jewish vote) against State Department alarm (support for a Jewish state would alienate the Arab world). To secure U.S. interest in the Middle East, the Eisenhower administration balanced support for Israel and for Arab nations, favoring, however, the Arabs...Except as an occasional object of charity, Israel practically dropped from sight in American Jewish life soon after the founding of the state...Across the political spectrum, American Jewish intellectuals proved especially indifferent to Israel's fate...Then came the June [1967] war. For American Jewish elites, Israel's subordination to U.S. power was a windfall. Zionism had sprung from the premise that assimilation was a pipe dream, that Jews would always be perceived as potentially disloyal aliens. To resolve this dilemma, Zionists sought to establish a homeland for the Jews. In fact, it gave the charge of dual loyalty institutional expression. Paradoxically, after June 1967, Israel facilitated assimilation in the United States: Jews now stood on the front lines of defending America -- indeed, 'Western civilization' -- against the retrograde Arab hordes...Accordingly, American Jewish elites suddenly discovered Israel."
"After the 1967 war, Israel's military élan could be celebrated because its guns pointed in the right direction -- against America's enemies. Its martial prowess might even facilitate entry into the inner sanctums of American power. Previously Jewish elites could only offer a few lists of Jewish subversives; now, they could pose as the natural interlocutors for America's newest strategic asset. From bit players, they could advance to top billing in the Cold War drama. Thus, for American Jewry, as well as the United States, Israel became a strategic asset."
"In a memoir published just before the June war, Norman Podhoretz giddily recalled attending a state dinner at the White House that 'included not a single person who was not visibly and absolutely beside himself with delight to be there.' Although already editor of the leading American Jewish periodical, Commentary, his early memoir includes only one fleeting allusion to Israel. What did Israel have to offer an ambitious American Jew? In a later memoir, Podhoretz remembered that after June 1967 Israel became 'the religion of the American Jews.' Now a prominent supporter of Israel, Podhoretz could boast not merely a White House dinner but of meeting tete-a-tete with the President to deliberate on the National Interest."
Podhoretz has written two books, 'Ex-Friends,' and 'My Love Affair with America,' which are essentially apologia for the damage he did to America in his early years and his entry into the leadership of the Neoconservative Movement in America. Irving Kristol evidently has no such sentiments.
The Jewish authors of 'The Holocaust Industry' reveal that "After the June war, mainstream American Jewish organizations worked full time to firm up the American-Israeli alliance...Coverage of Israel in The New York Times increased dramatically after June 1967...A favorite posture of the post-1967 born-again Zionists was tacitly to juxtapose their own outspoken support for a supposedly beleaguered Israel against the cravenness of America Jewry during The Holocaust. In fact, they were doing exactly what American Jewish elites had always done: marching in lockstep with American power...To protect their strategic asset, American Jewish elites 'remembered' The Holocaust...Jewish elites remembered the Nazi holocaust before June 1967 only when it was politically expedient...The Holocaust [however] proved to be the perfect weapon for deflecting criticism of Israel." This prehistory informs the rise of the 'power' of the Neoconservative Movement in the conduct of American foreign policy.
William Rusher, a former editor of the 'National Review,' summarizes (Wash. Times, 'Warfare on the right,' 04/03/03) the distinction between Neoconservatives and the older Conservative Movement on the current political stage. "...it was the latter 'conservatives' who started the [squabble]. They call themselves 'Paleo-conservatives,' implying they are somehow older and purer rootstock of the breed. But in fact they first surfaced in 1986, in reaction to the influence in the Reagan administration of an earlier group of converts called the 'neoconservatives' -- former liberals who, under the leadership of Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, had broken with the left in the 1960s. It was the 'paleos' -- who oppose 'foreign interventionism' -- who claimed that the 'neos' had hijacked the conservative movement to serve an agenda of their own, notably support for Israel."
Rusher continues. "In fact, both the neos and the paleos were preceded on the scene by the group that formed itself under the leadership of Bill Buckley and National Review as early as 1955, and which has been content ever since to describe itself as simply 'conservative.' But these conservatives welcomed the neos when they came aboard in the 1960s, and have suffered for this hospitality by being lumped by the paleos with their enemies the neos."
The National Review (Ponnuru, Ramesh, 'Getting to the Bottom of This 'Neo' Nonsense,' 06/16/03) asks "Have neoconservatives hijacked the Bush administration's foreign polity? That's the charge of opponents of the Iraq war on both the left and the right. [Liberals] think that an 'easily manipulated' president has been the neoncons' victim. The neocons took advantage of Bush's 'ignorance and inexperience' to take over American foreign policy, and Don Rumsfeld, an 'elderly figurehead,' was unable to stop them. Patrick Buchanan claims that a 'neoconservative cabal' is running American foreign policy in the interests of Israel."
The article describes the Bush administration's convincing arguments that they are "capable of reaching their own judgments. What they have not contested, however, is the conspiracy theorists' fundamental premise: that the administration is pursuing a neoconservative foreign policy. In effect, they argue that…[President Bush] has become a neoconservative himself...The strongest argument for the claim that the Bush administration's foreign policy is neoconservative is its willingness to engage in 'nation building' in Afghanistan and Iraq. During the Clinton administration, most conservatives were hostile to nation building in Somalia and Haiti. Now conservatives are willing to use American Power to build democracy in places where it has never had any purchase. Surely this shift is a matter of conservatives' coming to accept neoconservative premises?" Paul Wolfowitz and John McCain are two public officials most commonly associated with this kind of neoconservatism.
The Scottish historian, Niall Ferguson, provides a sound explanation for the circumstances by which America finds itself at war with, not only the al Qaeda terrorists, but Iraq ('Colossus,' The Penguin Press, 2004). In a review of the history of the Middle East since the mandate of a Jewish state in 1948 through the Cold War support of Iran and Turkey, as well as special relationships with both Israel (security guarantees) and Saudi Arabia (oil interests) as a means of containing Soviet expansion to the area through its client states (Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Iraq), Ferguson finds that "the spread of international terror toward the United States necessitated a cross-border response."
Ferguson claims that "What was demonstrated to ordinary Americans on September 11, 2001, had been widely recognized by experts for many years. Terrorism may not be new, but today's terrorists have astonishing advantages over their predecessors. Technology means that vast destruction can be inflicted at negligible cost...The real cost of a nuclear warhead -- and certainly a real cost of a kiloton of nuclear yield -- are almost certainly lower today than at any time since the Manhattan Project." Recall that our NASAP report in the early 1980s revealed that it required only $135M and a four acre secret underground facility and 13-or-so reprocessing and fabrication experts to construct a nuclear weapon.
Ferguson concludes, with sound factual and technological argument, that 9/11 was not the historical turning point in America's world strategy but 11/9. After the East German revolution of November 9, 1989, it was suddenly apparent that the Soviet leadership would not or could not maintain the Russian empire by sending tanks into East European cities...It followed by implication that the U.S. now had a free hand more or less everywhere. On December 2 Bush and Gorbachev had formally declared the cold war over. On December 19 the [U.S.] invasion of Panama began."
Ferguson continues, "When Sadddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, he thus unwittingly created the opportunity for the United States to inflict on him the treatment it had just inflicted on Noriega...A unilateral regime change in Panama had been implemented with barely a murmur of international protest. Yet for two critical reasons Iraq proved to be different. The first was the belief...that intervention in the Middle East required the sanction of the United Nations. The second was that such a sanction, even were it to be unanimous, would not be legitimate in the eyes of the stateless Islamo-Bolshevists. For America's victory in the cold war had -- in the ruins of distant, half-forgotten Kabul -- been their victory too."
"The geographical focus of [American strategy] shifted repeatedly during the twentieth century...Gradually, however, the Middle East came to be the hub around which American strategy turned; because of Israel (and its victorious wars of 1956, 1967, 1973, and later) with the Arab states funded by Saudi Arabia, because of oil, because of terrorism. With the end of the cold war opportunities presented themselves to use America's reviving military power against one or more of those dangerous states that simultaneously threatened Israel, possessed oil, and sponsored terrorism. The question was not whether the United states would act against these sworn enemies, it could not afford not to. The question was whether it would do so alone or in partnership with its traditional allies."
Consequently, it was imperative that after 9/11 that the United States drive the Taliban and al Qaeda from Afghanistan and that it send a signal that would be understood to the leader elites in the Arab world that 'regime change' would immediately follow any state which we suspected of either sponsoring terrorism of global reach and/or attempting to develop a nuclear weapons capability either by indigenous programs or other means. That signal could only be sent with minimum cost via an invasion of Iraq and a concomitant 'regime change.' Why? Because we knew it could be done quickly and with a minimum of expenditure in men and resources. We had accomplished it before and knew the Iraqis' weaknesses. We were thus assured of military success.
We have accomplished this mission. It matters not whether Iraq can be 'reconstructed' into a model democracy. The mission is not, in spite of rhetoric from high places, to build a democracy in Iraq. After giving the Iraqis a decent interval to find a 'democracy' of their own, America should declare 'mission accomplished' and leave Iraq to its own destiny.
The question of whether or not the neoconservatives have led America to an endless quest of converting the Islamic states in the Middle East to a democratic form of government by force of arms will answer the question posed. Such a feat is simply not only impossible but inimical to what America stands for. We are not an empire in the sense of conquest. Our strength is in showing the world how a constitutional republic based on our founding documents bestows benefits of freedom, good will, and peace.
We must resist all efforts that divide us along ethnic lines (multiculturalism) in order to make any particular group 'safe' from the dominant culture. Resistance to such 'change,' whether Jewish inspired or not, must be encouraged and actively pursued. Such change will lead to dissolution, destruction and despair. Each such group must have 'faith' in the goodness of the traditional, dominant American 'heart.'
America must not have a strategic objective of 'making Israel safe from the world.' That can occur only so long as Israel remembers its history. Jewish secular power has only spelled disaster for the Jewish people. The curse of Saul is worth remembering. Indeed, George Washington warned of the danger of 'foreign entanglements.' We must beware!
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Note: This essay is supported by reference materials drawn from a varied source of viewpoints. Paul Johnson's book, 'A History of the Jews,' is a primary source and is reviewed at the links: 'The Jews from Antiquity to 1948' and at the link below which continues the review (Part II) from the formation of the state of Israel in 1948 to the present.
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