In a recent excellent article in Proceedings, Captain Mark Clemente addressed why the U.S. Naval Academy is conducting formal courses in leadership and ethics for midshipmen. Probably a goodly number of graduates of the Naval Academy have welcomed his explanation, particularly those who attended in the days when discussions o leadership, especially ethics, were not part of the formal curriculum. It was assumed that anyone able to gain admittance to that institution was already steeped in the fundamentals of good character, based on parental counsel and religious affiliation -- and/or the Boy Scouts. The principles for personal behavior were simple. Do good and you will be rewarded; do bad and you will eventually pay a price. Movies always had a happy ending. The bad guys had to pay a price for their evil ways. Crime did not pay. Lying and cheating were unthinkable for the serviceman, especially those expected to go into combat. Midshipmen of that period had no leadership text. Psychology and sociology were not part of the curriculum. Ethics was never mentioned. Asking 'why' was verboten. However, there was great emphasis on math, ordnance, and gunnery -- how to get hits with guns.

       The introduction of psychology and sociology into naval academic education took a unique form following World War II.  Dr. John Bartky was the superintendent of schools in Chicago before the war -- a tough leadership assignment. He joined the fray and became a key figure in the Navy's Bureau of Naval Personnel during the war, helping to establish some of the many training programs that were required. Following the war and his return to the academic world, he persuaded the Navy to establish a postgraduate course of instruction, concentrating on psychology, sociology, and some specific principles of administration. Commissioned officers with experience in the fleet were chosen for attendance as students, most in their late twenties or early thirties. They attended courses at Stanford, Ohio State or Northwestern Universities for one year or more. The objective was not to school the students in character development or ethics but rather to insure that the Navy had a small cadre of professional military officers who would not be persuaded in future wars to try to win with inkblot or vocational interest tests. Bartky wanted military officers to understand the limits of psychology and sociology, particularly testing; that there was a lot more to winning battles than relying on tests of the behavior patterns of individuals or groups of individuals. He had witnessed the fascination that some naïve naval leaders displayed during the war, as they listened to professional psychologists and sociologists contending that the war could be won with emphasis on social studies. He wanted the Navy protected from such theories and initiated the postgraduate program, which lasted about ten years. Although not intended to aid in leadership per se, it provided many leadership tools, appreciated by those who had been on active duty, particularly in combat. It provided useful information for those establishing combat training programs or commanding units that were liable to face crises.

       Many participants in this post graduate program were glad to see psychology and sociology introduced into the Naval Academy curriculum not long after the Bartky program was introduced, believing that such studies could contribute to better leadership. Some felt that the best time in the career pattern for such lessons was after some actual experience in the field, living with leadership problems. While undergoing the training, Bartky's students often commented that during their prior service in the fleet, it would have been useful to have the lesson just learned in the classroom. However, they recognized that the lesson would not have meant much without the experience. As Captain Clemente points out, 'theory without practice, is hollow.' There is a point somewhere in the career pattern when the study of human behavior can best be absorbed. Getting midshipmen involved in serious study of how people tick as individuals and as groups, must be applauded. Learning why ethical conduct is necessary in the military, particularly in combat, cannot help but improve leadership. Incidentally, the education in sociology during the Bartky program was very valuable in laying out the fundamentals of ethnic relations.

       Time brings changes to many things, including the concepts of right and wrong. A more analytical, questioning approach to the subject is now considered necessary. Combat experience, particularly during the Vietnam War, has shown that questioning authority is not only considered acceptable, but is obligatory in some situations. Further, the authority being questioned must learn how to deal with those questions. The nature of this relatively new approach to authority, seemingly in defiance of tradition, has many wondering what is going on.

       The subject has been addressed openly, at least in the press of Washington, D.C.  General Charles Krulak, a recent commandant of the Marine Corps has been quoted as labeling some aspects of the ethics training as 'mumbo jumbo.' His comment was rather off-the-cuff, made in response to a question following an inspirational luncheon speech. He probably would not have used that term, had there been more time to consider the question.

       Dr. Jerry Atkinson, an educated naval aviator (some say, the worst kind) has become concerned. He writes and publishes pieces that attack the current teaching, contending that the nature of the character education being administered, particularly that dealing with ethics, is dangerous -- an attempt to undermine the very essence of the military profession and maybe the U.S. society in general. Atkinson is intense in his interest about many issues and expresses himself in bold terms, often merely to focus attention on the issue -- to cause some reflective thought. He has certainly done that relative to the teaching of ethics at the Naval Academy. In the debate that has now become public, charges fly back and forth. Respondents to the charges are varied, some understanding and applauding Atkinson's concerns, others branding his alarms extreme -- off the wall. The average citizen, if interested at all, merely wonders what is going on. Therefore, Captain Clemente's explanation is welcome. It helps clear the air.

       One aspect that is particularly hard for the old sailor to comprehend is the interest in philosophy, since few of that age group knows much about the subject. Captain Clemente mentions Dr. Nancy Sherman, a professional academic with top credentials -- an ethics guru. She was key in the establishment of the ethics program at the Naval Academy. In attempting to inform the reader about Sherman's work, Clemente presents a few brief words about John Stuart Mill, 'classical utilitarianism,' and other 'major moral theories.' You would probably have to be a student in the class to get the full impact -- to understand exactly what is presented to the student. Which means that many who are not in class will continue to wonder why such theories are necessary, feeling that it does sound like 'mumbo jumbo.' Nevertheless, it is part of the program that Clemente describes, a program with the objective of producing 'leaders of character.'

       It would be hard to fault any discussion of 'character' by future leaders of combat forces. Character does count in the military. Studies of how character is developed and why good character is so essential in military combat can be helpful to the individual serious about a military career. Recent activities by some leading politicians indicate that character may count in the political world as well. 1999 was surely the year for discussions of ethics and character, with some interesting examples being provided by the nation's leaders -- examples that must have been useful in the classroom. Leadership -- including character development -- can be learned from bad examples as well as from good.

       One aspect that Captain Clemente addresses, which bears some thought, is the role of the prisoner-of-war in the teaching of ethics. The captain cites VADM James Stockdale as an example of the ultimate in military character and ethical behavior, based on the latter's admirable performance during many years as a guest of the North Vietnamese in a vicious POW camp. The lectures and writings of Stockdale have become hallmarks of education on morality and character development. He contends that studies in Greek philosophy at Stanford helped him greatly as he endured the travails when there was 'no light at the end of the tunnel.' All young people, not just those entering the military, should examine the behavior of Stockdale and his compatriots. Unfortunately, even the lurid tales, including at least one movie attempting to describe the POW situation, cannot convey a full understanding of what went on and the endurance of the human body and soul, in the fight for survival and honor. You probably had to be there.

       Stockdale's POW experience calls for a brief review of our treatment of returning POWs in recent history. Those from World War I were not heard from very much. Those from World War II were treated similarly. The general attitude, even among the POWs themselves, was that they had been unfortunate -- unlucky. Becoming a POW meant that you had lost personally. It was too bad that you had been captured but you were in a losing situation. Those POWs did not get much attention or reward for their experience, after being repatriated. Maybe the period of incarceration was not long enough to generate a public feeling of special obligation to the POW.

       Korean War POWs received much the same treatment. It is hard to remember any from that war. One of t hose still surviving is retired Lieutenant Duane Thorin, who was a chief petty officer at the time of his capture. One of the early helicopter pilots in the United States, he has an admirable record of rescuing or evacuating about 140 men, first from the waters around aircraft carriers in the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan. During his second tour in Korea, he was a member of a team penetrating North Korean territory, rescuing downed airmen or any who required evacuation from behind the front lines. On one mission, his helicopter crashed and he became a POW for nineteen months. His story of those days is fascinating. Strong character played a major role in his survival and in his leadership of fellow inmates, where commissioned officers were kept in solitary confinement, removed from the enlisted POWs. Thorin's character development took place, not in the classrooms of teachers of philosophy but on a farm in Nebraska during the depression where learning to use one's hands, developing a strong work ethic, and living by a simple strict moral code, was the way of life. No smoking, drinking, lying, or cheating allowed. Church was important, religion even more so. For serious study, one stayed with the Constitution and the Federalist papers. Following the Korean war, Thorin was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant, wrote a book [1] about the POW experience, and played a significant role in implementing training for the new Code of Conduct for POWs.

       Thorin became quite close to ADM Arleigh Burke when the latter was the Chief of Naval Operations. In many ways, it could be said that Thorin was the Jim Stockdale of the Korean War. He is still alive, using his hands and work ethic, while reflecting on the value of basic tenets of our society. He is an exceptional individual who would have done well as a member of our political structure. However, Korean War POWs did not generate much attention for public office or other signs of recognition. If there had been a POW hero from the Korean War, it would most probably have been Thorin.

       Next came the Vietnam debacle with its shame and stain. For whatever reason, the surviving POWs of that war have been accorded far different treatment. Maybe the reason for such treatment is the guilt feeling abuot that war and our abandonment of those men to the travails of the North Vietnamese camps, for such a long period. Maybe we feel so guilty that we are trying to make up for our less than honorable action in abandoning them to the enemy for so long. We have provided compensation not accorded previous POWs of the twentieth century. Jerry Denton became a rear admiral and later served as a U.S. Senator for six years. Douglas 'Pete' Peterson is the current ambassador to Vietnam. Bill Lawrence became a Vice Admiral, served as the Superintendent of the Naval Academy and the Chief of Naval Personnel. He has been accorded many honors as a favorite son of Tennessee. Ed Martin became a Vice Admiral and headed naval aviation for a few years. Sam Johnson is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Jim Stockdale headed the Naval War College and later was a candidate for the vice presidency of the United States. Now we have John McCain, long serving U.S. Senator, emerging as a candidate for the presidency of the United States -- the commander-in-chief of our armed forces. All of these men are of high caliber and would most probably have succeeded well in their careers without the POW experience. But it is evident that their treatment by the public has been markedly different than that accorded their predecessors.

       The concentration on Stockdale's experience in studying the development of character by future combat leaders is of interest. His theories, at least as advanced by Clemente, is that his study of the Greeks and the philosophy of Stoicism, were paramount in enabling him to not only survive the POW experience, but to set an exemplary example for others as a leader. Stoicism -- the indifference to pain or pleasure as defined by Webster -- is a concept that may well be the essence of character that is needed to survive when there is 'no light at the end of the tunnel.' Will Durant, a philosopher of some renown, addresses both Stoicism and Epicureanism as 'the apathetic acceptance of defeat.' He points out that the Greeks were ready for stoicism when glory had departed from Athens [2].  In the cold analysis of character, is the stoic philosophy really what we want to teach the warrior?  Doesn't concentration on a philosophy aimed at living with defeat out of line with the prime objective of a warrior?  It may be a great philosophy for survival in a POW camp, but is it the philosophy that should be touted to a leader heading for combat?  Shouldn't the training of a warrior concentrate on how to keep from getting capture -- how to use the weapon systems at hand in order to best the enemy in conflict?  If the battle is lost and surviving the POW experience is the goal, stoicism certainly comes into play. But enduring loss should not be the mindset of a combat leader; WINNING the conflict should be of prime concern.

       If you knew Jim Stockdale before he became a POW, you would not apply the words 'stoic' and 'defeat' to his way of life. He was a charger, a combat leader, and warrior of the first order. He inspired with his enthusiasm for everything, particularly for waging war. He knew his weapons systems and how to use them. He was not indifferent to anything, particularly his profession, and the people serving with him. He never thought about defeat. If you met him once, you did not forget the experience. He was representative of the Arleigh Burke philosophy of leadership -- the creed of the warrior.

       Burke's concepts of combat leadership were born from the heavy emphasis placed on knowledge of weapons systems and how to use them. His theory was simple. In combat, particularly when the outcome is doubtful, most troops will follow the individual that they think has the best chance of gaining victory and providing survival for the participants. They will tolerate a crude tyrant as a leader if they think he has the best chance of winning the battle. That best chance of winning relies heavily on the ability to maintain and use the weapons systems at hand. Study Burke's words, written in 1984 as he reflected on leadership in combat [3]. "If the equipment doesn't work in battle, it doesn't make much difference how much else the officers know, the battle is lost -- and so are the people in it. So -- it can be right handy to be a good engineer first -- and a brilliant theorist after."

       Admiral William Snowden Sims, thinker and exponent of naval thought following World War I, had a simple theory that goes along with that of ADM Burke. "It's the shots that hit that count." That creed became the fundamental of the leaders who served us so well during World War II. Many of the best were members of the elite 'gun club.' They concentrated on ordnance and gunnery studies at the Naval Academy and in graduate school thereafter. They provided the means for winning wars by getting hits that counted -- by perfecting the 'fist of the fleet' -- the weapons. One of the prime examples of such training is the late RADM William 'Deak' Parsons, Naval Academy Class of 1922. With an intense interest in physics, he flowered into a leading scientist. During his relatively brief career, he was instrumental in the development of the proximity fuse, adding greatly to the anti-air-warfare capability of all forces during World War II. He had much to do with the development of the Sidewinder air-to-air missile, still in use by our forces. He was the deputy to Robert Oppenheimer at Los Alamos during the development of the atomic bomb and was the 'weaponeer' on Enola Gay that dropped the bomb on Hiroshima. He was the vision behind the exploitation of nuclear energy in the propulsion of ships and the development of missiles, writing predictions as early as 1944 about the future of nuclear propulsion and ballistic missiles launched from submarines. His premature death at age 52, precluded the country from realizing his full potential. Had he lived, it is doubtful that the nation would have every heard of his classmate, Hyman Rickover. Parsons was a prime example of the 'gun club' creed -- devoting energy to the development of 'shots that hit.'

       There were other great members of the gun club -- products of the warrior ethic on how to win. W.H.P. Blandy was the guru of ordnance during most of World War II and headed the atomic weapons tests at Bikini. Dick Ashworth was Parsons' alter ego during the development of the atomic bomb. He was the weaponeer on Bockscar that delivered the atomic bomb on Nagasaki. He moved on to be a leader in the introduction of nuclear energy into the military services, including the development of a nuclear weapon delivery capability from aircraft carriers. Horatio Rivero, brilliant member of the Class of '31, Rhodes scholar candidate, served as the assistant to Parsons as the Navy moved into nuclear energy. Tom Connolly, Class of '33, was another Rhodes scholar candidate, winner of the language sword, runner-up for the athletic sword, member of the 1932 Olympics Team, early test pilot, key member of the team developing the Sidewinder missile and the father of the F-14 'Tomcat' aircraft which bears his name. Tom Walker, Class of '39, developer of the technique for delivering nuclear weapons from aircraft without blowing oneself out of the sky, is another gun clubber, one whose training was aimed not only at good moral character, but an ethos that provided the means of getting hits on the target.

       Some think we may have abandoned the Burke premise, which incidentally was not original with him by any means. Students at the Naval Academy for example, have options in their study and can major in many subjects besides weapons systems -- the primary tools of war. As you listen to exponents of the value of the Academy, you hear praise for the variety of courses offered, the terrific faculty, and the competitive status of the Naval Academy relative to high order civilian universities. Is that really what we want in our combat leaders -- people who are competitive with the graduates of general education institutions? Does not the role of the combat leader require a different curriculum and a different set of ethical standards? Do we need to learn the ethics for combat from the academic professional who has never spent a day in combat and never will -- or from the combat experienced Marine Corps master sergeant?  'Both' is probably the answer to that question, as Captain Clemente explains. The point being that for the combat leader, concentration on the weapons of war and how to use them is primary.

       A final point for consideration in addressing the ethos of the warrior is the teaching of tactics -- how to employ the assigned forces against an enemy of known or unknown capability. Captain Clemente points out that studies are included in the Academy's curriculum dealing with actual warfare conflicts -- including the Marine Corps withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War. Those must be significant. The teaching tactics -- how to employ your own forces against those of an enemy -- is the subject usually reserved for post-graduate studies at war colleges, but it could be included for midshipmen as well. The emphasis on athletic competition that has been instituted is one way of learning tactics. Participating as a member of an athletic team can provide valuable lessons for the fledgling warrior on how to win. Even better is the coaching of such teams. Analyzing the opposition's strengths and weaknesses (the threat), matching one's own forces against that threat, and devising tactics for winning, are wonderful ways to prepare for the real world of combat. The ritual practiced by the coach of a professional football team as he prepares for his weekly battle against the opposition, involves all of the aspects required of a combat leader in preparing for an engagement with enemy forces. Each Sunday night, the coach must study the films, analyzing the opposing team next on the schedule (the threat). Then comes matching the strengths and weaknesses of his own team against those of the enemy, which includes devising the plays (tactics) for offense and defense. Next comes the practice of the tactics with a simulated enemy. Finally is the direction of the battle, from the sidelines (the flagship), on Sunday afternoon.

       Maybe warrior ethics at the Naval Academy should include some formal instruction in the coaching of football. Imagine a guest professor like Joe Gibbs or Mike Ditka teaching a course in tactics for the combat leader. There is a thought. Ditka and Gibbs teaching the Brigade of Midshipmen how to 'beat Army.' It sounds like fun -- something that could be very useful for young midshipmen aspiring to a career in combat. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security advisor under President Carter, recently commented on the similarity between football and war [4].  Maybe there are some valuable warrior lessons in learning how to coach.

       The success of the current Naval Academy program dealing with character development is hard to assess. Captain Clemente states that the Academy is proud of its program and one cannot argue with that contention. However, the old skeptic will point to an evaluation by a recent graduate. While serving as senior midshipman, Carrier Howe, Class of '98, wrote a column for the monthly Shipmate magazine, published by the U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association. In her final column in the Spring of 1998, these words were part of her farewell as she left for the challenging career ahead:

                "...Unfortunately, the Naval Academy is no longer a school for warriors.
               While it's still a great school, the emphasis is that we are training to prepare for war
               does not exist like it used to exist. Somewhere after plebe summer it fades away, and we
               hit the books.  Instead of being the United States Naval Academy, the school that produces
               amazing leaders and officers in an intensive four year leadership laboratory, we are slowly
               leaning towards ROTC.  The administration stresses Academics. Instead of having an over-
               abundance of well-rounded Midshipmen who don't have 4.0s, we have really smart Mids
               who study a LOT.  Although the military of today is on the cutting edge of technology and
               needs officers who are technically proficient, we also need officers who know their
               people and who are prepared for battle in a time of war. We exist to defend our
              country.  I think that is what we need to be reminded of more often…"

       Such statements are encouraging for they indicate that the students know something about the qualifications for leadership in combat. But they do continue to make one wonder about what is going on.

       The effusive alarms from those concerned about lessons in ethics at the Naval Academy are undoubtedly too extreme. But designers of the curriculum for inculcating traits and characteristics that will serve the combat leader well, must not ignore the warrior ethos (and they probably don't as Captain Clemente points out). The training can include an introduction to the Greeks and to Stoicism. Anything that stimulates thought about how to lead in combat -- and survive--is useful. However, concentrating on survival after capture must not take precedence over studies on how to keep from being captured in the first place. The ultimate must be schooling on how to WIN, the objective of any combat leader.

       Captain Clemente's explanation indicates that combat leadership is always foremost in the objectives of the Naval Academy, in spite of the emphasis on Stoicism. May old combat veterans hope so. At any rate, is it not fortunate that the Naval Institute provides a forum for discussion of the issue? Who is going to be next at bat?

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Footnotes:
1) Thorin, Duane, "Ride from Panmunjom," Regnery Press, 1956.
2) Durant, Will, "The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Great Philosophers," pp.76, Simon and Schuster, 1933.
3) Burke, ADM Arleigh, "Winning Naval Battles," Wings of Gold, pp.20, Association of Naval Aviation,Fall 1984.
4) Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "War and football," The Washington Post, pp.A28, 7 January 2000.
5) Howe, Carrie, "A Few Inches from the Yard," Shipmate, pp.29, U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, May 1998.
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End of footnotes.



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