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To: Stewie-baby Now that we have cleared up the matter of 'who won the Cold War,' we can get on to your assertions that you "gave your full support and respect" to Pipper Burns when you served together in VF-2. You as XO and he as your "...#1 JO come FITNESS Report time." You state that "...it's OK to have a difference of opinion in today's Navy, but when the rubber meets the road we are still on the same team." Presumably, you must mean that you and Pipper disagreed on his role as a 'whistle blower' with respect to the Hultgreen and Lohrenz affairs. Does this mean that you agreed with SecNav Dalton that LT Burns, "your friend" and valued squadron mate deserved to be cashiered out of the Navy? Or does it mean that you would not have taken the risks that LT Burns took in attempting to raise a matter of grave safety up through his chain of command? Or does it mean that, having failed that course, you would not have made the training records of the two flawed female 'fighter pilots' public? Just what does your after-the-fact support of LT Burns mean? As you say, "Brothers in Arms forge a special bond and never turn on each other." But when one 'brother' is a superior officer and the other 'junior,' it is incumbent upon the senior to show leadership and character. And that may entail taking a risk, yes Stewie-baby, a risk that may have cost you something tangible in support of your 'Brother in Arms.' Please tell us what risk to your career that you took in support of Pipper? Here is what I am getting at. The January 2001 issue of the USNI 'Proceedings' features an article on leadership by CAPT James F. Kelly, Jr. entitled, "In Search of Real Leaders." He states that, "One is not a leader by virtue of rank, nor does one inherit the 'mantle of leadership' merely by assuming command or other positions of authority. To be a leader, one must practice leadership behaviors." CAPT Kelly tells us that, "...Instead of building professionalism and excellence by keeping the best and most competent leaders in command long enough to achieve some long-or even intermediate-term goals, we marched officers briskly through command tours that were as short as one year or even one deployment. This was just enough time to permit them to do some real damage but short enough to enable them to avoid blame for it.Our career managers then would rotate them ashore, back into the Washington 'arena' for more visible but less risky assignments, leaving, too often, a mess for some successor to clean up or get blamed for. Even if the successor could rectify the mess and add value of his own to the command, he seldom would be around long enough to get any credit." "We have done this under the guise of maximizing command opportunity. In other words, we have put career building ahead of building excellence and professionalism. We have produced an officer corps of ticket punchers who view every assignment in terms of career value...A consequence of these years of emphasizing career building is officers who are so intimidated by Congress and the news media they would do nearly anything to appease them and protect their own careers. If it is career suicide to stand up for a subordinate who may be unfairly under fire or to tell the unpopular truth ... well, better to live and fight another day, they rationalize. Time to 'put it behind us' for the 'good of the service' they say. This may be good management, but it is not leadership. The Navy suffers now because of it." Given this view of leadership in the command structure of today's Navy, Stewie-baby, just how did you 'stand up for Pipper, your friend and Brother in Arms?' To whom in the command structure did you take your support of LT Burns. How high up the chain of command did you go? I will tell you that I have had two fighter squadron skippers who would not have hesitated to go to the mat for a J.O. like Pipper Burns. And they would have done it in a heartbeat. And they would have risked their careers to do so. In fact, one such former CO is supporting my efforts to 'get the word out' such that he has personally contributed a five-figure sum for advertising for my new Eternal Vigilance journal. He knows leadership when he sees it. I don't know you Stewie-baby. So I cannot judge whether or not you actually risked anything in support of Pipper. But I am certain that Pipper knows. And others in your former squadron and, presumably, on your cc: list must also know the extent of your support of a 'friend and Brother in Arms.' You may be the leader you seem to think you are. The rest of us can only guess. It is of no consequence that the rest of us learn the truth in this matter. But it does matter to the future of the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, let me tell you what a real leader with character would have done in that position. Take it from RADM C.A. 'Mark' Hill, Jr. USN (Ret.) who PUBLICLY took on SecNav Dalton on Pipper's behalf. RADM Hill responded to a letter by Mr. Dalton on the LT Burns matter in The Washington Times, "Truth should trump PC in Naval aviation," 5/24/98. RADM Hill wrote, "...in his letter Mr. Dalton uses ADM Arthur as a straw man against Lt. Patrick Jerry Burns wherein the Admiral is the paragon of 'core values of honor, courage and commitment' while Lt. Burns, in his view, dishonored the service by revealing the double standard in training and favoritism that had occurred in an effort to place two women at the head of the line, despite dismal performance, as qualified F-14 pilots." "Mr. Dalton states, 'Lt. Burns broke the law and did not uphold our core values.' I disagree. Rather, I submit, professional dissent at the risk of one's career has been a hallmark of some of the Navy's greatest heroes and leaders. Let me state some examples." "CAPT John G. Crommelin. From a career zenith reached as executive officer of the WWII carrier Enterprise and subsequently commanding officer of his own aircraft carrier to duty as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- with a sure shot to flag rank and beyond. It was John Crommelin who released to the press copies of official letters exchanged between Pacific Fleet commanders and the Navy secretary that deplored, from the Navy's view, the failure of the then-current administration to appreciate the value of Naval Aviation. President Truman's Navy Secretary Matthews immediately ordered CAPT Crommelin suspended from duty, which terminated his career; but the subsequent fight waged by ADM Arthur Radford and CAPT Arleigh Burke, which almost cost the latter his stars, resulted in Congressional hearings that made the professional Navy's case clear to the public." "VADM Thomas F. Connolly. Serving as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, ADM Connolly was under the strictest orders from Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's civilian team to support McNamara's concept of a single fighter aircraft design for both the Air Force and the Navy. This was the infamous TFX in its initial stage (subsequently designated F-111B for the Navy) which arose from a concept of saving money on paper without any documentation on how that could be accomplished in practice, while providing income for a Texas based aerospace company to help the political fortunes of the vice president at the time." "Following years of work and millions spent, it was apparent to the Navy that the F-111B would never fly from a carrier. A Navy team had been working surreptitiously on an alternative that would be equipped with the same weapon system, but no one on the McNamara team would listen to professional opinion. Finally, in a showdown with Congress on the budget, following hours of testimony from Secretary of the Navy Paul Ignatius about how great the F-111B design was, Sen. Stennis asked ADM Connolly his personal opinion about the aircraft design, assuming it was equipped with more powerful engines. ADM Connolly leaned forward and said in the strongest terms that 'There is not enough thrust in all of Christendom to make a carrier fighter out of this aircraft.'" "Sen. Stennis took money from the budget for the F-111B on the spot and authorized what was to become the F-14 or 'Tomcat' which serves in the fleet today. In his words, ADM Connolly thought he was going to be fired and thinks Sen. Stennis saved him from that -- but he lost any chance for his fourth star. Throughout, he was supported in his end run around the Navy secretary since the chief of naval operations, ADM Tom Moorer, had authorized such candor prior to the hearings." "CAPT John R.C. Mitchell. In March of 1978, ADM Tom Moorer, then retired from his last position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked to testify before both the House and Senate with his views on the nuclear powered carrier (CVN) program. President Jimmy Carter and his Secretary of the Navy had made very clear their opposition to that program and Navy Secretary Claytor had commissioned a Navy study to support the substitution of a smaller, conventionally powered carrier (CVV) of 60,000 tons or even smaller. A Navy-sponsored [study] reached conclusions favoring the administration's desires based on a series of assumptions that had to be contested effectively if the 'big' carrier program was to survive." "Knowledge of his part in the defeat of President Carter's program cost John Mitchell the stars that he should have had. But without him, we might not have had the nuclear powered super carriers USS Theodore Roosevelt, Lincoln or Washington." "Virtually from the birth of Naval aviation in 1911 the investigation and results of aircraft accident reports were made 'non-punitive.' Common sense dictated that the facts of each mishap be obtained without evasion or distortion so that corrective action could be taken to preclude reoccurrence. Flight and operational safety took precedence over all for nearly a century in the most hazardous of professions. In this sense Naval aviation was incorruptible. Had it not been so, we would have lost our carriers years ago. To the best of my knowledge no one ever tried [to corrupt the process] until we reached the era of political correctness." "There was no dishonor to a brave woman like Kara Hultgreen to lay out truthfully to the public exactly what happened. Nor should accomplished officers of high rank be denied advancement solely because they act responsibly in an administrative capacity to drop from the Navy list those people who would be a danger to themselves and others based on their recorded performance." "Lt. Jerry Burns had enough experience to appreciate the potential for disaster that the training records of these two women portended for performance under ideal conditions, to say nothing of conditions that can try even the best of pilots in a dangerous game." "He tried but failed to convince his chain of command that corrective action should be taken within the system, rather than be covered up. Lt. Burns, like the foregoing examples, is paying the price for his actions. Perhaps it is because he recognizes that where we can recover from a 'hollow' military when weapon systems are concerned it is much more difficult to recover from an officer corps that does not place truth above all. Truth is the lifesaver in this business while failure to tell it is the killer." RADM Hill PUBLICLY amplified this line of reasoning in a national media talk show with the following commentary. "Instead of cashiering LT Burns, the CNO should have assigned him directly to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations with the title of Special Assistant for Training and Qualification Standards for Naval Aviation -- reporting directly to the CNO. This would have sent a strong signal to both the uniformed Navy and the civilians who administer it that 'a line has been drawn in the sand' and that the Navy will not tolerate a double/reduced set of standards in naval aviation, or elsewhere." So, how was it Stewie-baby? Did you stand up for the TRUTH in LT Burns' defense? How high up the chain of command did you take your quest in the defense of a 'friend and Brother in Arms?' Just what risks did you take in his defense?
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