Dear Jack,
       Thank you for your letter of May 26, 2000, which both reviews my philosophy as evidenced by the essay on the "Das Boot" episode involved in teaching Midshipmen modern ethical theory as well as your own approach to the subject matter based on your combination of combat, operational and administrative experience.  You will note that, initially, I leave out mention of educational background because with only one year apart on our entrance and graduation from the Naval Academy I accept, as a given, that up to that point they were roughly the same.

       I emphasize the word "roughly" above since we all have individual differences in the way we accept and think about the information imparted to us even though the subject matter may be similar or the same.  For example, in our time at the Naval Academy the course of instruction in English, History and Government was the major source for indoctrination in the humanities.  Every other course was either scientific or professional in nature.  Having a great interest in military history, I managed to devote many hours of free time to my own research in our Mahan Hall library.  Further, I never missed the opportunity to be present at the lectures in Memorial Hall given in the evening to midshipmen (where attendance was voluntary) by that retired commander of the old Construction Corps. Although I cannot recall his name I will never forget the nasal way he had of speaking as he presented his views and insights on military history from Salamis to Jutland, complete with "lantern slides" as the view graphs of that day were called.

       It was before Pearl Harbor and we were still without combat experienced leaders to instruct us on what to expect should we become involved in the current war.  You may recall that about the only officers at the Academy who wore ribbons on their blouse were our Superintendent and Commandant with only the WWI Victory Medal indicating any possible combat experience.

                (Indeed years later Vice Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr. [USNA '19],
                when he was Chief of Naval Personnel, admitted that until the advent
                of WWII he had not been separated from his family for more than
                three weeks.)

       When, in his lecture, the Commander described "Jutland" and brought the picture of Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper to the screen along with his verbal account of Hipper's flawless performance and the accurate gunnery of the German battle cruisers, ending with personal details of the part Hipper had played after 22 hours on the bridge, retiring to his sea cabin for 20 minutes of rest prior to returning to the bridge for the night steaming en route Heligoland Bight, there was an audible murmur from the midshipmen in attendance.  That was the nearest example we ever heard as to what we were to experience following Pearl Harbor until we had battle tested officers of our own returning from the Pacific to speak to us.

       I have all twelve volumes of Will and Ariel Durant's "Story of Civilization" on my bookshelf and nowhere do I find in all their philosophical discussions anything that is more pertinent to what the combat and operations environment in which we have lived since that time is like, than as described to us in the Commander's lecture.  As author Colin Gray puts it by the subtitle to his recent book, "Why war isn't gong away...Even with technological advances some things are immutable."

       Wherein you state agreement with my thesis regarding the three most significant changes at the Naval Academy since we were midshipmen (i.e., the prohibition against mandatory chapel, the introduction of women into the student body and the loss of status as Midshipmen U.S. Navy); our viewpoints diverge in assigning the blame.  Where you put it squarely on the back of our "civilian masters," you fail to take into account the lack of opposition from the uniformed service leaders.  I have subsequently learned that mandatory chapel was lost in a federal court before one judge and there are experts in the field who now feel that his decision could have been reversed if taken up the line to the Supreme Court.  The uniformed leaders simply failed to act.  With regard to the issue of women, I sat next to Jim Watson in a private discussion in his office as Chief of Naval Personnel when he turned to me and said "if they ever allow women into the Naval Academy it will destroy the institution" -- but where is the record of Congressional testimony where Jim or anyone else placed their stars on the line in opposition t that monumental change?  And did not the ultimate downgrading of the Naval Academy diploma as evidence of a professional education for a lifetime calling occur when one of the institution's graduates was a senior senator on the Armed Services Committee who could have called forth all the weight he needed from the active duty graduates as well as the alumni to defeat the change from the U.S. Navy to USNR on the graduates' commission?  Where was the "straight talk express" then?

       What I say in the previous paragraph was brought home to me during a time when as a lieutenant I served as the Aide to one of only five admirals who wore the line star above their gold stripes who had not graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy.  Rear Admiral Rico Botta, our foremost Aeronautical Engineer at the time -- a Naval Aviator who had served with Admirals Leahy, Radford, and Carney and was both highly thought of and trusted by them, had started as an enlisted aviation machinist mate working on the Liberty engines of WWI in 1917.  Botta gained his commission by professional exam from the enlisted ranks following the first World War.  He learned to fly despite Navy doctors that tried to reject him for physical reasons, earning an early  Naval Aviation number and distinguishing himself as both a carrier and patrol boat pilot and squadron commander.  As the holder of the engines desk at old BuAer during the thirties it was Botta's rigid defense of the radial air cooled engine against the Army Air Corps liquid cooled engine in the fight for the limited appropriations available for military aviation during the depression years that made possible our successful carrier operations during World War II in the Pacific.  Time and again the Admiral would say to me "when you hear naval officers blame the "system" just remember that they are really blaming themselves since they are the system.

       I believe that your use of the term "civilian masters" needs some amplification.  It is true that the Constitution does give the power to the Congress to both maintain and make laws for the Navy while it makes the President the Commander-in-Chief.  The members of that body and the incumbent chief executive acting themselves or through certain designated representatives do have the power to set the policy.  However under military law as codified in Title 10, U.S. Code, that power is either precluded or severely limited when individuals attempt to apply it for purely political purposes to suit one's own agenda.  As you know, officer promotion up to the level of O-8 must be decided by a board of senior officers with selection based upon a professional record wherein those officers considered "best fitted" are placed first in order of seniority.  Even the President is precluded from directing an individual's selection by name, rather he must describe the nature of the duty for which an incumbent is desired.  Above the level of O-8, there is no question that the Executive has complete authority to use his own discretion, which, in turn, is only limited by the confirming power of the Senate.

       The very fact that selection up to O-8 was confined to only those who had superb professional records in comparison to their contemporaries had the effect of forcing the hand of the Chief Executive in three and four star appointments, confining his selections to only the best.  For most of the twentieth century just passed, those officers were of such character and integrity that they could and did tell even the President where he was wrong at the possible expense of their own removal.  Here I refer, inter alia, to:
                Admiral J.O. Richardson who told F.D.R. that Pearl Harbor was a "death trap and without a logistic train
                  he didn't have a fleet, rather he had just a bunch of ships.  He was right but he was relieved.

                Admiral Thomas C. Hart who was relieved of the Asiatic Fleet (7th Fleet) when he refused F.D.R.'s order to
                  serve under the Dutch Admiral Helfrich whose subordinate Rear Admiral Doorman was leading our ships
                  through his own mine fields.  There was no fleet commander more prepared to meet the enemy despite old
                  and obsolete equipment than Admiral Hart.

                Admiral Arthur Radford who led the fight for the big carrier in the revolt of the Admirals initially banished to
                  the Pacific but saved by President Eisenhower and made Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop the
                  Air/Sea strategy by which we prevailed in the Cold War.

                Admiral Arleigh Burke who was the catalyst in bridging the gap between the naval aviators in opposition to the
                  surface and submarine officers following World War II, subsequently providing Admiral Radford with the
                  strongest support during the fight for Naval Air which very nearly cost him his first stars.

                Admiral Tom Moorer who when ordered by Secretary McNamara to cease and desist referring to the action in
                  Vietnam as a "war" simply told him that "they might not think it a war in Washington but out here in the
                  Pacific we know it is a war!"  Later it was Admiral Moorer who planned and executed the Christmas bombing
                  that brought our POWs home, not by bypassing the Secretary of Defense as Melvin Laird complained but by
                  convincing the President that Laird should be overruled.

       All the foregoing you may know just as well as I, but I state it here for background in reply to your challenging my view of the warrior spirit.  The essay that I wrote [see above, "The Military and New Age 'Ethics'"] to which you refer was limited in scope on this issue since I was only criticizing the Midshipman's view of an aspect of submarine combat. Even so the emotional reaction of individuals will differ depending on the circumstances.

          [Note to the reader: The following is RADM Hill's counter to RADM Barrett's contention (letter to Hill dated
           5/26/00) that "I am uncomfortable with your...'Das Boot' analogy of German WWII submarine operations in
           developing your themes of warrior/warrior spirit, band-of-brothers and TRUST. I was personally involved up
           to the level of Executive Officer in the sinking and damaging of many, many Japanese combatant and merchant
           ships in my two years of combat on the submarines HALIBUT and TREPANG during World War II. I cannot
           remember ever feeling like a warrior with a warrior spirit. I was just trying to do my duty to the best of my ability.
          Nor can I see how an institution can measure itself against an over-riding goal of developing warrior/warrior
          spirit. That comes later as one is faced with both the wartime and peacetime challenges of our profession. I felt
          more like a warrior in the planning, programming and budgeting Pentagon challenges than I ever did in my seven
          cold war commands at increasing levels of complexity and responsibility.]

       In my case I will never forget the elation I felt in my first combat experience as a junior officer standing on the bridge with Captain Brooks Harral to relay his orders to the conning tower during a night surface attack on a nine ship convoy. On a dark night in the Molucca Sea north of Halmahera with only two Mark-14 torpedoes remaining in our stern tubes capable of running on the low power required for the 5,200 yard run to a large tanker, one torpedo hit amidships followed by a tremendous explosion simultaneously followed by a line of fire that lit up the sky to almost daylight. This was followed by the second torpedo which hit a minelayer moving up along side the tanker, exploding his magazine in a brilliant flash of white.

       We did not understand the strategic importance of that sinking until we copied a congratulatory message for that action from General Douglas MacArthur through the 7th Fleet to the Captain, Officers and Men of the "Gallant Ship RAY," since the AKEBONO MARU class tanker was carrying high octane gasoline to the Japanese forces on New Guinea, the loss of which enabled MacArthur to take Biak without encountering significant enemy air opposition. And I don't think we were alone in our exuberance since I know that Roy Benson and Fritz Harlfinger would often dance around TRIGGER's attack periscope saluting and saying "Heil Hitler" when they scored a hit with their torpedoes.

       However, you will get nothing but agreement from me on the need for equal toughness of mind, tenacity and vision in both the planning and programming efforts to meet present and future goals for our Navy to qualify as the "complete" warrior. This aggressive spirit, in my view, is not limited to just competing against the military and civilian leaders in the Pentagon but as a prerequisite for success against the broader political resistance encountered on Capitol Hill from members of the Congress and their staffs. All the flag officers enumerated above certainly qualify in that regard but let me amplify by relating a personal experience with one of the best in our time, that paragon of a war fighter and administrative infighter -- Admiral Arleigh Burke.

       I had been ordered to the Bureau of Naval Personnel to relieve a classmate of yours as the head of Officer Plans when the manpower crisis of the age was how to get the huge numbers of WWII officers through the senior grades with acceptable attrition while also convincing the Congress that the military needed a substantial pay increase across the board. It was at a time when one Chief of Naval Personnel had departed with his fourth star to command our naval forces in Europe and his relief, Vice Admiral Page Smith, had come from the Atlantic Fleet where he had served as deputy to Admiral Jerauld Wright. On the day in question Admiral Burke was scheduled to testify for the Navy before the Senate Armed Services Committee and wanted the support of Admiral Smith to answer any questions that might arise regarding the Navy's officer promotion problems with what was called the "World War II Hump." Admiral Smith had already indicated shortly after taking command of BuPers that legislation to limit the attrition required by adherence to the then-current law was dead in his view, but he asked that I accompany him just in case questions came up that needed to be answered.

       We met with the Chief of Naval Operations in his office in the Pentagon to go over the answers to possible questions immediately prior to the hearings. Admiral Burke listened initially with some impatience, then expressed his frustration with the failure of many on the CNO staff to be effective in the Pentagon in his support, stating that perhaps we should recognize that the best destroyer man, naval aviator or submariner was not necessarily the most effective officer to have in the fight between the services and the Congress for appropriations. Maybe, he said, we should develop specialists for the purpose which, as it turned out, was exactly what the many members of the civilian secretariat and the Congressional staffs were pressing him to do.

       We arrived at the Armed Services Committee hearing shortly thereafter. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Personnel were the scheduled witnesses for that day, Tuesday, March 11, 1958. Toward the end of Admiral Burke's testimony and answers to the questions posed to him by the Senators and Committee Staff, the Chairman, Senator John Stennis, asked Admiral Burke to present his views on the Navy's "hump" problem, at which point the Admiral motioned to me to step forward. From that point on I held the floor at length and the complete transcript of the testimony is appended as enclosure (1).

       When you get to page 413 of the testimony you will see a large red asterisk at the end of one paragraph. That is the point at which the crowded hearing room broke into applause -- not the front row of senior officers but the rows behind which were filled with officers of all services in the effected year groups and a great many of their wives, those loyal ladies who no longer seem to matter in the feminist agenda. From the second red asterisk on page 414 of the Committee report ending with the third asterisk on page 415 you will see the answer to Admiral Burke's concern about how Senator Stennis was viewing the Navy's personnel placement.

       About two hours after I had returned to my desk, a messenger showed up with a hand written card from the CNO on which I was thanked for my testimony of the morning, saying that it had done the Navy a lot of good and asked that his note be made a part of my record. A few days later when I had an opportunity to thank him personally, Admiral Burke smiled and brushed it aside saying "Oh, I was watching the anxious look on the face of your boss and the other grim faces in the front row and I thought that you might need some help downstream." But Admiral Smith was big enough to turn around and give his full support to the required legislation which took another year and a half, and it changed your life, my life and the lives of thousands of other officers forever.

       The point I make is simply this. Admiral Burke was right in his frustration with his staff since all those who are aggressive operators at sea are not necessarily effective in a very different environment dominated by civilians ashore. The corollary is that if the officer is a "pussy cat" at sea, you can be reasonably sure that he won't be a "tiger" ashore. He may, however, be the very type of sycophant that many civilians seek out to do their bidding in an effort to control the services and make the decisions that rightfully belong to the military professionals.

       Admiral Tom Moorer has no peer when it comes to this combination of warrior who is equally adept at sea or ashore. To listen to him tell of his experiences when his PBY was shot down in the South Pacific, picked up by a Philippine ammunition ship along with his crew, shrewdly estimating the potential for survival of that ship when targeted by Japanese bombers by having his men follow him in jumping overboard at just the right moment to avoid being killed in the blast, grabbing hold of one of the ship's lifeboats and getting his crew aboard initially and then having all jump back into the water to avoid their being killed by strafing from enemy aircraft, rounding them up again and finally making a landfall at Darwin, Australia, -- then completely destroyed and deserted as a result of the Japanese attack. It is a tale equaled only by the saga of "Men Against the Sea" in the "Bounty" trilogy. No one of our generation has navigated the rocks and shoals of the civilian power structure in pursuing his objectives and goals with more skill to our benefit than he. And it was not until I had Tom Moorer's approval of my essay that I used it for a speech (later published -- copy enclosed) and then only after Admiral Moorer had given a copy to Vice Admiral Ryan, currently the Academy Superintendent, for his perusal and use.

       We were not brought up in our day to look at our role as "hat in hand" to civilian office holders. We knew that civilian control of the military -- which was bequeathed to the nation by the wisdom of General Washington in persuading his officers not to revolt against the Congress for its failures to compensate them and later placed in the Constitution under his authority as the presiding officer of the convention that framed that document -- was the only way that the Republic could remain free from dictatorial control. We looked upon ourselves as equals with authority in professional matters that were within our purview, with full recognition that we were always constrained by the law, always subject to the pleasure of the President and always aware of the power of the Congress that held the purse strings. One cannot imagine any of our great naval leaders acquiescing to the decline in status that appears to be all too common today. A couple of examples of the way we were, one of which I have read, one of which I have heard follow:

                At a time when Franklin Roosevelt was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he was embarked in a destroyer
                  commanded by Harold R. Stark, later to be his Chief of Naval Operations when he was president. They were to
                  transit the Cape Cod Canal at night and, while F.D.R. was on the bridge, Commander Stark had evidenced
                  some concern about going through at night. Franklin Roosevelt spoke up and said, based on his yachting
                  experience, that he would take the ship through. Stark replied, "I doubt that you have the authority to relieve me
                  sir" and with that he rang up "all ahead full" and made the transit at high speed.

                At a time before WWII when change of command of the U.S. Fleet was accomplished with considerable
                  ceremony and in full dress, one of the guests embarked for the occasion was Senator Greene of Rhode Island,
                  Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. When he arrived on the quarter deck following officers
                  call attired in just an aloha shirt, the Admiral faced him and said that if he wished to be present during the
                  proceedings he would have to return to his cabin and put on a coat and tie. The Senator did as he was directed to
                  do by the Admiral. Read, also, how Admiral Moorer authorized VADM Tom Connolly to speak freely before the
                  Senate Appropriations Committee in the face of  Secretary of Defense McNamara's prohibition to state the truth
                  about "the infamous TFX" in my Washington Times article, "Truth should trump PC in Naval Aviation" - a
                  copy of which is appended.

          [Note to the reader: The following is RADM Hill's counter to RADM Barrett's attempt (letters dated 5/26/00 and 
           7/20/00) to denigrate and smear the reputation and motives of Dr. Gerald L. Atkinson, CDR USN (Ret.).]

       Now let me take up your question about Dr. Gerald Atkinson. Our first meeting occurred at a time when the services were being pressured by the Clinton Administration's attempt to permit homosexuals to serve openly in the military. A "Defense Readiness Council" was organized made up of distinguished retired officers headed by Admiral Tom Moorer, for the purpose of supporting the active duty Chiefs in what we knew to be their strongly felt resistance to such a major change in policy with its adverse affect on readiness and morale. At a meeting of which I was a part, several people interested in helping appeared before our group to offer advice and suggestions as to how to proceed. They included Elaine Donnelly whom you know, Ronald Ray -- a retired Marine Corps JAG Colonel, author of the book, "Military Necessity & Homosexuality" -- and Dr. Gerald Atkinson.

       All three had strong views and good ideas. Elaine Donnelly proposed setting up a seminar with a panel to give presentations before members of the Congress at the Dirksen Senate Office Building but it would require financial support. I suggested to Admiral Moorer that we had resources that could be used and he agreed to allocate over $2,000 for that effort.

       Subsequently, "we" -- meaning Admirals Tom Moorer, Jerry Miller and "Mark" Hill -- came up with a substantial five figure amount to support Ron Ray in an "amici curiae" in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in opposition to the granting of a commission to Joseph Steffan, the homosexual midshipman who was appealing his dismissal from the Naval Academy. That amicus brief was the turning point for the Appeals Court ending the case in favor of traditional moral values as set forth in law by Title 10, U.S.C., Section 5947, as part of the Navy's First Principles, by denying Steffan's appeal since the homosexual lobby did not risk taking it to the Supreme Court for fear of losing.

       The brief itself I am sending to you by separate cover along with additional material. It is a vital part of my argument as to what has subsequently happened at the Naval Academy with regard to ethics training which I will come to shortly.
       Dr. Gerald Atkinson was in the process of writing a series of monographs on the cultural decline of the nation entitled "Enough is Enough." Although not initially persuaded that what Jerry Atkinson was writing at the time would fit into the Council's objectives, I was subsequently persuaded to read what he had sent to me of his monographs by Captain Howard W. Alexander (USNA '55) who had been my flight Officer as a lieutenant when I had command of VA-72 and one of the ablest naval aviators I had at the time.

       Over time I learned that Dr. Atkinson's operational and combat experience as a naval aviator combined with an educational background in the sciences with his PhD in Nuclear Engineering was well worth supporting along with his concomitant dedication to those "first principles" of honor, virtue and trust that were the foundation of the U.S. Navy during our long period of service. He has a shrewd, insightful mind with a gifted command of the English language and an ability to put his thoughts in writing both clearly and concisely. I have read everything that he has written for public consumption since 1993 and I am unaware of any piece on the [Barrett's specific false and scurrilous charge]. However, I think that he is the man to answer that charge or to clarify any doubt in your mind about his thinking in that regard. He may be reached at his e-mail address of <atkinson@newtotalitarians.com> or you may access his web site at http://www.newtotalitarians.com.

       Before you speak to Dr. Atkinson, may I suggest that you read his article published in the March 14, 1999 Washington Times entitled, "Loss of Trust and Confidence" -- a copy of which is enclosed. Atkinson, citing from his own combat experience, sets forth in a meaningful way why absolute "trust" is a requirement at every level in the chain of command to ensure success not only in combat operations but in the maintenance of morale through the drudgery and routine of daily life at sea during long deployments.

       The interesting thing to me is that no one seems to be willing to take him on nose to nose or toe to toe on a point by point basis since Admiral "Bud" Edney tried it (Washington Times, August 15, 1999) and then got blown out of the water by Jean-Francois Orsini, President, St. Antoninus Institute (Washington Times, August 22, 1999). Those that do, do it obliquely using the same "spin." (Copies of both articles enclosed.)

       You note that on page 5 above, I said that it was Admiral Moorer who gave a copy of my essay [see above, "The Military and New Age 'Ethics'"] to the Academy Superintendent and it was Vice Admiral Ryan who in a letter to Admiral Moorer acknowledged that "the Academy is not the same as when Admirals Moorer and Hill went there -- it is better. That is the "spin." That is the standard argument used by many institutions of higher learning -- i.e. we are the best because of the number of Nobel Prize winning professors we have on the faculty, or the courses we teach -- not the number of graduates we have who have distinguished themselves in later life.

       Do you really believe that the Naval Academy is "better" than the institution that gave us Chester W. Nimitz, Charles A. Lockwood or Samuel D. Dealey along with a host of other greats in the past? I would like to think that is is just as good, in the hope that when those graduates arrive at the top they will have the same dedication to the truth and with adherence to standards of professional conduct that will inspire absolute trust and confidence all the way down to the seaman recruit. That "spin" itself is a variation of what the Air Force used against us for years in the fight for procurement dollars. As one Air Force B.G. once said, "You Navy types always talk about what you can do now and you are right and you can prove it -- we in the Air Force never talk about that. We talk about the future and it is always better and there is no way to prove us wrong."

       I question your reason for not opening the subject of today's Naval Academy for public discussion. I sense the implication that non-Naval Academy graduates do not belong. I have always considered our alma mater, like West Point, as the institutions established to train officers as the "core" for combat leadership. This is what has separated them from any other institution of higher learning with the possible exception of private schools such as VMI and the Citadel. In time of emergency they have never failed the nation in their leadership role, but all would have been for naught unless they had had the support of the far greater number of able men drawn from civilian life that they could organize, train, teach and inspire in those times of emergency. Such has always been the raison d'etre of the institutions themselves. I can think of countless numbers of men under whom I have served and who have served under me that fit the mold of Naval Academy Graduates without having been there based on how that dedication was transferred in troubled times. So I recommend that you do not discount Atkinson until you have developed a better understanding of what drove him to support General Krulak's opposition to certain aspects of the Naval Academy's ethics program as evidenced by Krulak's address to the Naval Academy Alumni Association and as set forth in Atkinson's article in the Washington Times of July 25, 1999.

       For myself, I can tell you that I have good reasons for not wanting to take the time to attend a 'brain washing' session with the current instructors at the Academy simply by reference to the enclosures to your letter as well as the brief phone conversation that I had with Admiral Chiles [the second holder of the Distinguished Chair for Leadership at the Academy].

       First, when Admiral Chiles invited me to come listen to what they were doing, we had just a short conversation about submarines. I mentioned that the difference in having been in combat in submarines as opposed to Cold War and peace time submarine operations was like night and day. He immediately agreed with that. I followed that up with a question about his views on women in operational billets at sea in our combat ships and he said that he was adamantly opposed to women in submarines. Some thoughts on the ethical approach immediately arose in my mind:
                If the Academy was teaching ethics designed to accommodate a rationale for putting women in combat ships,
                 why make exceptions for a weapons system whose role is essentially deterrence such as the ballistic missile
                 submarine? Nothing comes closer to former Representative Pat Schroeder's definition of how the next war is
                 going to be fought -- i.e., "How much strength does it take to push a button?"

                Since of all our combat ships the one most immune from enemy reprisal is the ballistic missile submarine which
                 seeks to be avoided at all costs, why put women in small ships like the U.S.S.STARK which was hit by an Iraqi
                 missile while patrolling the Persian Gulf and survived only through the heroic efforts of its male crew -- and
                 would have been lost if ten of those crew members had been replaced by women?

       Make no mistake about it. I do not believe that women should be in any of our combat units --  aircraft carriers and embarked squadrons, surface ships or submarines -- and anatomical differences are reason enough to sustain the argument against their use therein. Not only is it totally incompatible with that first principle of American Naval Service currently codified as Title 10, U.S.C., Section 5947, but how do you make the case for a double standard from an ethical point in favor of one class of ship over another?

       Indeed, even today (June 22, 2000) there is a letter to the editor in the Washington Times from a retired Captain and former Commander of a submarine division that sets forth all the reasons for not having women as part of a submarine crew and every point he makes is equally applicable to every other combat ship in the fleet (copy enclosed). Are the water-tight doors any lighter on a carrier?  Is the unit cohesion on a submarine any more important to combat effectiveness than the aircraft squadron ready rooms on a carrier?  Have you ever stood in the middle of a burning fight deck and observed how many men it took to push a burning jet over the side with no wheels?

       Turning to the enclosures that you sent with your letter, I read all of them. However, I discount anything written by Colonel Paul E. Roush after reading his attempt in the August 1997 Naval Institute Proceedings to discredit former Secretary of the Navy James Webb whose remarks at the Naval Institute Annual Conference in April 1996 set forth in beautiful English prose his concern for how "moral courage" had become "less important as a promotional criterion than political correctness" among the Navy's officer corps.

       I will be blunt. Paul E. Roush graduated with the Naval Academy class of 1957, one of 848 graduates with a class standing of 838 or tenth from the bottom. He served with the Marines in Vietnam for a relatively undistinguished one year tour. James H. Webb, Jr. graduated with the Naval Academy class of 1968, one of 836 graduates with a class standing of 314 from the top. He served in Vietnam as a Captain, USMC, in combat action that him a Navy Cross, a Silver Star, two Bronze Stars and at a cost in wounds to justify two Purple Hearts. Ronald Ray, who served on the President's Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces and served as an Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense, characterized Roush as the Naval Academy's resident "commissar" to force the fight for women in combat. James Webb served as the Secretary of the Navy and, in so doing by his forthright stand on the issues, joined those great graduates listed above who had the courage to tell it like it is and take the consequences. Between the two, the contrast is vivid -- I would not want anyone with me at sea or in combat other than Jim Webb.

       From the start, I have emphasized the importance of knowing the law in great detail. It was interesting to me that when Roush wrote his rebuttal to Webb, he used "Tailhook" as an example of "professional deficiencies -- in truth telling, in respect for persons, in military discipline" and on and on. In so doing he denies Webb's assertions that it was an affair that should have been handled at the top with dispatch in which the miscreants should have been prosecuted under the law and the problems stemming therefrom resolved. Then he quotes from a Wall Street Journal article in June 1996 co-authored by Senators Daniel Coats and Kay Bailey Hutchinson wherein they quote from -- you guessed it -- Section 5947 of Title 10, U.S. Code. Where do you think those Senators learned of that rather obscure provision of Title 10?

       You see, when I had to know that law as a commander, I learned one very important lesson. It is the person who has to administer the law who must have the details at his hand -- that the members of the Congress don't know them and rely on their staffs -- and any naval officer worth his salt shouldn't have the job if he can't be ahead of the staff. Here I am talking of a time when the Committee chairmen were giants like Richard Russell and Carl Vinson and their councils were WWII veterans in the Air Force for Braswell in the Senate and the Marine Corps for Blandford in the House. Today, in my opinion, none have the stature of those in the past -- neither members or staff.

       With regard to "tailhook" and the promotion for Commander Robert Stumpf to Captain, I wrote to the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee setting forth my views on why Commander Stumpf should have his number as Captain after he had already been confirmed by the full Senate. One of those letters was addressed to Senator Dan Coats and a copy of that letter is attached. You will note that the date on that letter is February 28, 1996 and predates the article in the Wall Street Journal by Coats by some four months. I doubt if Coats even saw the letter but I am sure some staff member did, kept it in some pigeonhole until it was useful, then wrote the article for the Senator. But what I had said was twisted around completely with regard to the application of Section 5947 of Title 10, U.S.C. to the subject at hand. Read my letter and then read the appended pertinent paragraphs from the Roush article in the proceedings and then tell me who is right.

       Read, also, the letter to Senator Grassley regarding his comments on the Senate floor -- three months before the Wall Street Journal article by Coats -- and tell me where I am wrong in that one. The fact of the matter is that the Congress is on the horns of a dilemma. They cannot eliminate Section 5947 from the Code since they would lose all control over its moral precepts, while at the same time they cannot change the wording to define women of good character as a "lady" in view of the role women have now been given in the service without antagonizing the feminists and other women as a voting bloc.

       Only yesterday I received a letter from Admiral Carl Trost asking for my support in Elaine Donnelly's efforts and the Center for Military Readiness. In it he writes, "I remain personally opposed to placing women in positions exposing them to direct combat, or in units such as submarines where the "cons" of such assignments far outweigh any hoped-for increase in unit combat readiness." How does that square with placing women in cockpits of fighter and attack aircraft on carriers when the only substantial number of combat veterans in the Navy since WWII have been Naval Aviators and where the peace-time operational losses in carrier aviation have always been in an order of ten to one over any other branch of the service?

       What Carl Trost is doing to help Elaine Donnelly is laudable and I understand that his letter is being effective. But would it not be even better if Carl Trost, as a former Chief of Naval Operations, would state publicly his opposition to the interference being placed in Elaine's way, by the current Navy Judge Advocate General, with regard to the deposition of Navy witnesses that she requires in her defense -- not only senior admirals but civilian members of the secretariat as well?

       Further, with regard to the scathing references to "deficiencies -- in truth telling -- regarding 'tailhook'" that appear in the Roush article, what about the failures in truth telling regarding the loss of Kara Hultgreen flying off the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN that were imposed upon the Navy without noticeable resistance from the "blue team" at the time?

       Jack, when you and I were sworn in as Midshipmen, U.S. Navy, we became part of an institution that exuded Victory. Victory proceeded from every building and from every symbol -- from the Chapel crypt with the remains of John Paul Jones, to the battle flags in Mahan Hall of the GUERRIERE captured by Isaac Hull and the CONSTITUTION and one of that ship's kedge anchors by which Captain Hull escaped from the British squadron to allow CONSTITUTION to become the great symbol of victory that she is.

       But the Naval Academy and the U.S. Navy represented something just as important. Both the institution and the service exerted a moral force that we did not question. Unlike Winston Churchill's characterization of the Royal Navy as being based on "rum, sodomy and the lash," our Navy eliminated sodomy at its founding thanks to John Adams and the Continental Congress through what is now Section 5947 of Title 10, U.S.C. The lash was eliminated in 1862 as a result of the testimony to a committee of the Congress by Captain Uriah P. Levy, himself court-martialed six times for his defiance of the views of seniors, becoming the first American of Jewish faith to serve a full career as a naval officer and using his personal fortune after retirement to save Monticello, the home of Thomas Jefferson. Rum, or Splicing the Main Brace, was eliminated by Secretary Josephus Daniels through his General Order Number One during the First World War.

       I have given you enough to think about for now. I will end by acknowledging that there is reason enough to talk about ethics and review the effect or lack thereof at the Naval Academy. I just think that it should be confined to a host of issues that have arisen similar to the above and that voices should be heard on both sides without regard to political correctness. I agree that including ancient philosophers in a short course with the humanities -- without the use of facilitators -- can serve to broaden the mind of today's midshipmen. But I strongly disagree with the one-sided approach that has been installed. I think that being immersed in the ethical issues of the 21st century is more important for midshipmen than being lost in the often contradictory reasoning of the ancients.

       Finally, I think that we should make every effort to return the Naval Academy to what it was when you and I entered that greatest of all institutions -- one that symbolized victory and NEVER defeat.

       Sincerely,


       /S/ 'Mark'
       Clarence A. Hill, Jr.
cc: Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
    Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller
    Rear Admiral Ned Hogan
    Captain Bob Jones
    Dr. Gerald L. Atkinson